Kursk? More like curse!

TL;DR: The first (major) incursion into Russian soil by enemy troops since the Second World War might end up being much more costly for Vladimir Putin outside of the battlefield than on it.

I would love to be capable of writing up a detailled analysis of the ongoing fighting between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Russian Armed Forces, highlighting tactical adjustments by either side, and shining the spotlight on key events in the battle that are probably vital for the future of the war.

Sadly there is so much going on the battlefield, with unholy amounts of conflicting information going around and so many small events and details that I didn’t even notice because, at the end of the day, I’m an armchair general, that I have to leave this one to the actual experts.

What I’d like to talk about instead is the effects the Ukrainian offensive is having on Russia internally, and what effects it might have or cause to Russia and especially the regime of Vladimir Putin in the long(ish) run.

From the start of the Ukrainian advance, Russian authorities have presented the operation as desperate, as a last ditch effort by the UkRaInIaN jUnTa to delay their inevitable military defeat. However, that story becomes harder and harder to maintain with more and more footage showing severe Russian losses coming out of the conflict area, and with Russian television broadcasting columns of refugees fleeing out of the frontline region. It’s becoming clearer by the day that the “master strategist” once again failed at being .. well, a master strategist.

To the surprise of absolutely no one it turned out that the much televised defensive positions along the border (Remember the seemingly endless harping about “dragon’s teeth” all over the world?) are woefully inadequate and did almost nothing to even hamper down the Ukrainian push. According to Ukrainian sources the Russian chief of the generall staff Valeri Gerasimov even received intelligence about the Ukrainian plans, but dismissed them as “yet another border raid”. And the units tasked with defending the border were in a seemingly abysmal state as well, faltering almost instantly when confronted with forces that know what they were doing.

All of this is further eroding the status of Putin as this mythical man who never makes mistakes. And it doesn’t stop there, it’s going to get worse for him. Because the Russian military is not exactly suffering from an excess of competent troops these days the Russian Armed Forces are throwing whatever conscripts they can get their hands on towards the Ukrainian advance in order to get more time to pull together actually competent troops from other parts of the country or the frontline in Ukraine. You know, the conscripts who, as Putin specifically promised his population, wouldn’t take part in the conflict.

Not only have parts of these conscripts surrendered quite quickly, their deployment also has caused protests among parents of these young men, with the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia at the forefront of criticism.

There is also growing tension about the failure of the Russian authorities to adequately respond to the situation of the refugees from Kursk, with an initially total failure at providing even the most basic necessities such as food or housing. As bitter as it might be for them, but the Russians are used to corruption and ineptitude. But the willingness to suffer because of state incompetence has its limits.

Despite what some analysts might think, none of this is going to lead to a revolution or a palace coup. In a situation similar to the mutiny of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner last year Putin is going to pull through it. The alternative to Putin, which would mean a leadership vacuum in the middle of a war that isn’t going all that well for Russia at the moment, is even less appealing than the current situation to most Russians, including the upper echelons of the current government. But still, these events aren’t happening in a void.

At the beginning of the formal Russian invasion of Ukraine special military operation most ordinary Russians expected a quick victory over the “Khokhols”, as their leader had promised them. But time and time again there were setbacks, sometimes major ones. Putin might, for a while, have successfully argued that all of this wasn’t his fault. That it was incompetent cronies who let Russia down, not their infallible Tsar (I highly recommend this presentation by Martti J. Kari on the thinking behind all of this).

But now, with a visible inability to not only to win the war but, as it might seem to ordinary Russians, to defend the holy Motherland itself, that story is harder and harder to belief for the public. Additionally, provincial governors and state officials are not going to be happy at the end of this. Because right now, Putin is blaming them for everything that’s going wrong (maybe even rightfully so, but that’s beside the point), but once the state finally manages deal with the refugees from the combat zones and to rectify the military situation in Kursk, he’s going to try to collect all the laurels. Not exactly a recipe for happiness all around.

And this seems to worry Putin. At least that’s my interpretation of him having withdrawn almost entirely from public and of his behaviour during the security council meeting which was to address the “situation” in Kursk. He seemed less composed than he usually seems to be, moody even. And there was almost no substance to his statements, except the – to be expected – vague demands to “expel the invaders”. According to the Russian news outlet Verstka, who cited an unnamed senator, the “mood has become very alarming”. There seems to be a distinct lack of confidence in Putin at the moment.

I’m quite certain that Ukraine will have to withdraw from the Kursk region eventually, even though it will take Russia more than a three day special military operation to accomplish that (I am very much not sorry for that pun.).

But even if this serious incursion isn’t going to convince large parts of ordinary Russians that this war was a mistake, it still drove a point home for most Russians: Their ruler has let them down, again. And that the promised victory isn’t going to comes as quickly and way, way more costly than they were promised. Only time will tell what that realization is going to do to the stability of the Putin regime in the long run.

When I was about to publish this post Mark Galeotti released his latest episode of “In Moscow’s Shadows”. I haven’t listened to it yet, but I sincerely hope that his assessments isn’t the complete opposite of what I was stating in this post. He also mentions two articles, one about the reasons for certain appointments of Russian governors and one about the impact of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on Putin’s popularity that might be interesting to read.